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Article 4

Euthanasia: Some Points in a
Philosophical Polemic I
Luke Gormally
The author is director of The Lincare Centre for the study of the ethics of
health care, located in London, England. Gormally says, "The following
text is a very lightly revised version of a talk given at a national conference
on Euthanasia held in London, England on 11th March, 1989. The talk
sought to develop, for a large general audience, some points in a
philosophical polemic, against the background of contemporary British
debate about euthanasia. I am gratefulfor advice in revising the text to
John Finnis, to my colleagues Fred Fitzpatrick and Agneta Sutton, and
especially to Mary Geach."

In most societies there is an admixture of civilization and barbarism: the
legal and political institutions of a society more or less adequately embody
recognition of those principles which help to secure ways of living
consistent with human dignity and the destiny of man. But every 'society
falls short of securing, in its governancy of human relationships, that every
human being be protected against arbitrary exercises of power.
Our society is well-ad vanced on the road to systematic rejection of
principles for the protection of human life which rest on a recognition of
the dignity of every human being. This rejection is most conspicuously
embodied in the legalization and widespread practice of abortion, and in a
defense policy, adopted on our behalf by successive British governments,
which depends on the conditional intention to murder innocent civilians. I
shall argue in this talk that acceptance of the practice of voluntary
euthanasia in our society would be a significant further step in the
direction of barbarism, i.e. a state of affairs in which human beings, at
times of great vulnerability, are no longer protected by the canons of
justice, but are increasingly at the mercy of the arbitrary exercise of power.
Civil authority, of course, exists to prevent this, not to promote it.
Christian Vocation to Witness Truth
Every Christian has a vocation to witness to that truth about man which
is knowable through the works of creation as well as that which is revealed
in the word of God. In face of the contemporary assault on human dignity,
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it is urgent that Christians collaborate insofar as they can in this task of
witness.
My assignment, however, is not that of reflecting on revealed truths
-the theological task undertaken by Dr. Cameron - but of offering on
the topic of euthanasia some reflections which one would hope any man of
good will could recognize as true without the benefit of revelation. The
philosophical literature on euthanasia is beginning to be voluminous, so I
shall have to be very selective about the points I cover in the time at my
disposal. I have confined myself to a limited number of points in what one
might call a philosophical polemic against euthanasia. In consequence a
number of important issues are not addressed.
I shall begin by focusing on voluntary euthanasia partly because the
legalization of voluntary euthanasia is the immediate objective of the
euthanasia movement. I shall seek to identify the fundamental reason
which is made to bear the burden of justifying the killing of patients who
ask for euthanasia. I will then go on to ask whether this is an acceptable
reason for killing people, and whether, as a society, we can accommodate
such killing consistent with the fundamental assumptions of our legal
system. I shall argue that we cannot, and that not even the high value
placed on autonomy in the liberal political tradition provides reason for
legalizing voluntary euthanasia. Finally, I offer some reflections on the
effect the practice of euthanasia would have on the practice of medicine.
Definition of 'Voluntary Euthanasia'

Let me begin by defining what I mean by "voluntary euthanasia". By
"voluntary euthanasia" I mean the intentional causing of a patient's death
or, more plainly, the intentional killing of a patient in the course of medical
care, when the killing is carried out at the patient's request, and the patient
is believed by a doctor to have good reason to be killed because of his or her
present or foreseeable mental condition and quality of life.
There are four elements to this definition of voluntary euthanasia.
(I) First, it involves intentional killing: in other words a doctor aims to
bring about a patient's death either by something he does, for example, by
a lethal injection of a toxic substance, or by something he deliberately
omits to do, precisely with a view to bringing about death .' He may, for
example, fail to give a patient the nutrition he or she needs precisely in
order to bring about his / her death; in other words, he may starve him / her
to death (this is done to handicapped babies). Or he may withhold
necessary life-prolonging treatment, which he had an obligation to
provide, precisely in order to bring about death . So one can intentionally
kill someone by deliberate omissions, by deliberate failures to act, just as
much as by positive deeds. We should be clear that, in one way or another,
euthanasia involves intentional killing. Euphemisms like "easing the
passing" and "helping to die" are linguistic devices of the devil (or
Orwellian "newspeak") designed to prevent clear thinking.2
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(2) The second element in the definition of voluntary euthanasia is that the
killing of the patient is in the course afmedical care. Clearly people other
than doctors can kill patients for euthanasiast reasons . But proponents of
voluntary euthanasia are particularly interested in having doctors kill
patients as an accepted part of clinical practice. If we may judge by the
evolution of abortion practice, it seems clear that nurses will come to be
expected to playa prominent role in the execution of euthanasia.
(3) The third element in the definition of voluntary euthanasia is that the
killing is carried out at the patient's request. Proponents of voluntary
euthanasia place great emphasis on the importance of the free, rational
choice of the patient; and some of them insist that they have no wish to
promote nonvoluntary euthanasia [i.e. the killing of patients, like babies,
incapable of giving consent] or involuntary euthanasia [i.e. the killing of
patients contrary to their wills]. But whatever the present attitudes of some
proponents of voluntary euthanasia, I shall argue that if there are good
grounds for regarding it as acceptable clinical practice then the most
important objection to nonvoluntary and involuntary euthanasia will have
been undermined.
(4) The fourth and final element in the definition of euthanasia is that the
patient is believed by a doctor to have good reason to be killed because of
his or her present or foreseeable mental condition and quality of life.
The existence of the request suggests that the patient believes she has
good reason to be killed by a doctor. But it is the doctor who is to do the
killing. It is the doctor, therefore, who needs to be satisfied that he has
good reason to kill the patient.
Erroneous View of Prognosis
Requests for euthanasia, as is well known, may be prompted by a
patient's erroneous view of her prognosis, or by depression that a doctor
can readily see to be transient. So it is quite common for doctors who have
no principled objection to euthanasia to nonetheless reject such requests.
The mere fact of a request cannot itself provide a good reason for carrying
out euthanasia.
Some requests, however, seem to proponents of voluntary euthanasia to
be rational, and to provide good reasons for doctors to kill patients.
Typically, they have in mind the kind of patient who finds intolerable her
extensive physical degeneration, perhaps involving immobility, and
double incontinence. Her sense of worth and dignity has perhaps been
closely tied up throughout her life with the independence she has enjoyed.
Extreme dependence on careers makes life seem no longer worthwhile.
There is a variety of conditions which can lead some people to think they
no longer have worthwhile lives, and thus lead them to want others to end
their lives. Does a patient's present or future quality of life provide a
doctor, or, as it may come to be, a nurse, with good reason for killing that
patient? Further, is it the kind of reason which our society should
16
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recognize as acceptable either through a reform of the law designed to
legalize voluntary euthanasia, or through the acceptance of a code of
practice conformity to which, on the part of a doctor carrying out
euthanasia, would ensure freedom from prosecution? These are the key
questions.
Throughout the history of human societies, certain types of killing have
been thought to be justified. In the Western tradition of common morality,
which has been deeply influenced by Jewish and Christian moral norms, a
distinction is made between justified and unjustified killing. This
distinction is fundamental to the legal framework of our societies, and in
particular to the criminal law protecting the lives of all citizens.
Underpinning the traditional distinction between justified and
unjustified killing is the belief that all human beings are equal in dignity.
What makes us equal in dignity is simply our humanity: all that we have in
common is the fact that each of us is a human being. We vary enormously
in capacities and achievements. But our fundamental rights do not depend
on how well-endowed with talents we are nor on the level of ability we
achieve. Unless it is the case that there is a basic dignity attaching to our
humanity, then it becomes a matter of choice whom we treat in accordance
with the requirements of justice. If human dignity is not believed to attach
to our humanity but is made to be a matter of ability or achievement or a
particular quality oflife, then we hand a "carte blanche" to the powerful to
define which lives are not worthy of protection.
Dignity of Every Human Being
A society which wants to uphold justice in the treatment of all its
members needs above all to hoJd on to an understanding of the
fundamental dignity of every human being, and to resist any changes
which would, in practice, subvert that understanding.
The long-established belief that some forms of killing are morally
acceptable relies on justifications consistent with upholding the dignity of
every human being, whatever his or her conditions or circumstances. For
the defense of killing in a just war, justly conducted, and the defense of
capital punishment, after a properly conducted trial, rely on the
proposition that those to be killed must in some sense deserve death. Now
there are those who believe that death can never truly be deserved, as well
as those who, while holding that it might in principle be deserved, object
that it is not deserved by most soldiers in the army of an unjust aggressor or
by certain criminals found guilty of capital offenses. But the important
point to grasp for present purposes in considering the question of whether
there ever can be justified intentional killing is this : the traditional defense
of some forms of killing does not serve to undermine human dignity.
Paradoxically, as it may seem, it assumes a very strong belief in human
dignity. Only a man who knowlingly and willingly does grave wrong can be
held answerable for it and can be said to deserve death. On the traditional
May, 1990
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view of human dignity, human beings have a special dignity precisely
because of the capacity inherent in human nature for knowing the
difference between good and evil and for freely choosing which to do.
Now let us remind ourselves again what is involved in involuntary
euthanasia. One person , a patient, asks another person, a doctor, to kill
him ur her. The mere fact of the patient's asking does not provide a good
reason for complying with the request. What is supposed to provide a good
reason is a patient's well-founded claim that she is suffering or expects to
suffer serious degeneration, together with the belief that this degeneration
is intolerable and incompatible with her sense of having a worthwhile life,
a life of dignity as she has understood it. Such a patient has come to the
view that she no longer has a worthwhile life, that such natural life as may
be left to her will be devoid of dignity.
Doctor's Two Questions
There are two questions for a doctor confronted with such a request:
- the first is: Is he prepared to agree that his patient, along with other
patients, have not got worthwhile lives, that their lives are devoid of
dignity?
- the second question is: Does he think the judgment that a patient has
not got a worthwhile life justifies him in killing that patient?
If the doctor is ready to say "yes" to the first question then he has, as far
as belief is concerned, jettisoned what is essential to the foundations of
justice in our society: for the foundations of just ice, as we have seen, rest on
the belief that every human being, just by virtue of being human, possesses
an inalienable dignity. And that dignity stands in the way of one ever
killing another human being for reasons other than the requirements of
justice; that is for reasons which amount to a denial of the human dignity
of that human being.
If a doctor says 'Yes' to the second question and acts on that ·Yes' - in
other words if he kills a patient because he agrees that she has not got a
worthwhile life - then in the most decisive way possible he has made his
own the view that not every human being enjoys a dignity which prevents
us disposing of their lives for reasons of convenience.
It is clear, I think, that what has to bear the burden ofjustiJying killing in
voluntary euthanasia is the judgment that a patient lacks a worthwhile life,
lacks value. If you subscribe to that judgment, you effectively deny that
every human being has an inalienable dignity, just in virtue of his or her
humanity.
Members ofthe Euthanasia Movement are more or less clear-headed in
recognizing that the justification even of voluntary euthanasia rests
ultimately on the claim that some lives lack value. I have elsewhere
published an analysis, which I shall not even summarize here, of the false
understanding and false valuation of human life which underpins the
Euthanasia MovemenP What I am now concerned to draw attention
18
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to is that propagandists for euthanasia require us to jettison what is
indisputably fundamental to the legal framework of our society: the view
that all men are equal in dignity.
Members of the Euthanasia Movement are not all clear-headed about
the implications of their position. Some are disinclined to acknowledge
that the justification of the killing they wish to see carried out in clinical
practice must be a judgment on the value or worthwhileness of the patient's
life. They protest that the doctor is merely accepting the patient's valuation
of her own life. 4 But the question which has to be answered is: Is the doctor
right to accept that valuation and so to kill the patient? One reason why
some people clearly think that such a doctor would be right is because they
believe that human life has indeed no given objective value; the value of
each human life is to be determined by each indivicual human being. The
belief of many euthanasiasts about a patient requesting euthanasia is that
"If she says her life is worthless, then it is worthless."
It is not necessary for present purposes to show why that view is gravely
mistaken. I merely draw your attention to two of its implications. First,
were the view taken really seriously in the practice of medicine, it would
leave psychiatrists with little reason for seeking to prevent suicides. The
second and more important implication is that if we have not got an
objective worth given with our humanity, then all men are not equal in
dignity. Do people in our society wish to embrace such a view?
Since the real onus for justifying voluntary euthanasia is borne by the
judgment that a patient has not got a worthwhile life, it is clear why
voluntary euthanasia is a halfway house to non-voluntary and involuntary
euthanasia. If a sufficiently powerful and influential group can define
some people in society as lacking worthwhile lives, what good reason is
there to prevent the killing ofthose unfortunates? No doubt there are some
people in the Voluntary Euthanasia Movement who wish to halt at the
halfway house; but there are others who want to move on to the
elimination of the senile, the subnormal, and the seriously handicapped.
Support for paediatric euthanasia, for example, is considerable.
Enthusiasm for these grim ends is not an aberration in the Euthanasia
Movement; it merely spells out the real logic of support for voluntary
euthanasia. Once you begin to behave as if you have good reason to kill
people when you judge they no longer have worthwhile lives, then why
limit killing to those who ask for death? When you think that some human
beings are lacking in all dignity, why should you respect their lives when
you have power over them? As Chesterton perceptively observed many
years ago: "Some are proposing what is called euthanasia; at present only a
proposal for killing those who are a nuisance to themselves; but soon to be
applied to those who are a nuisance to other people".
Political Liberal's Argument
The political liberal may persist in arguing that a man should be at
liberty to satisfy any of his desires providing that in doing so he causes
May, 1990
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no harm to his fellow human beings. Such liberty, it is claimed, is the
precondition for, if not the substance of, autonomy and self-determination.
I confine myself to three observations on this claim.
The first is that voluntary euthanasia is not an exercise of autonomy or
self-determination. The habit of thinking that it is is much encouraged by
the deceptive expression "assisted suicide." But voluntary euthanasia is
never a case of someone killing himself, but always a case of someone being
killed by another person. And when we are asked to legalize it, we are being
asked to accept that killing of ·one private citizen by another may be
justified on the grounds that a human being's life lacks value, is not
worthwhile.
The second observation is that we do not value political freedom or
liberty as a freedom to satisfy whatever desires people just happen to have.
Our sense of the value of freedom arises from our sense of the importance
of developing in such a way that we come to be able to distinguish between
intrinsically worthwhile desires and worthless desires. "Satisfaction of
some desires makes for human fulfillment, satisfaction of others for
human misery. Insofar as human beings are able to identify with
intrinsically worthwhile desires and to engage in stable commitments and
projects in pursuit of the realization of those desires, they show themselves
to be human beings who have achieved autonomy or a state of genuine
self-determination. Political freedom is valuable in providing opportunity
for the exercise of autonomy in this sense.
"But this ideal development could not have been achieved without the
existence of institutions (such as the family, the school, the university)
which impose constraints conducive to the formation of genuinely
autonomous persons. So the existence of autonomous agents presupposes
constraints .. . . Now, clearly, one of the institutions whose constraints
are conducive to the formation of the autonomous individual is the
criminal law. Knowledge that one lives in a society governed by norms of
justice provides a sense of elementary security, without which there cannot
be that sense of belonging to a community which is so conducive to
nurturing autonomy. It would be radically destructive ofthis arrangement
if it became lawful to kill a person because 'he did not have a worthwhile
life' .. .. So a true sense ofthe requirements of autonomy ought to lead us
to reject the legalization of voluntary euthanasia."5
My third comment on the political liberal's plea that a man should be at
liberty to satisfy any of his desires providing that in doing so he causes no
harm to his fellow human beings, is that satisfaction of the desire to be
killed by a doctor does incalculable, harm to the doctor and thereby to the
practice of medicine. The harm done to the doctor is that his character is
deeply corrupted by his euthanasiast decision.
Why should this be so? The practice of medicine necessarily exposes
doctors to horrible things and obliges them to make tragic decisions. Why
should the addition of euthanasia to a doctor's repertoire make such a
difference to men who are in any case obliged, for instance, to balance the
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likely death resulting from a treatment against the pain and trouble caused
by withholding it? The explanation lies in a distinction of quite
fundamental importance for understanding the moral life, a distinction
which, however, is widely regarded by utilitarian philosophers as opaque.
The distinction is between what I intentionally bring about and what I
bring about as the foreseen consequence of what I intend. In general, what
I intend to do is precisely what I choose to bring about, either as the end I
am aiming to achieve or as the means necessary to secure my end. Choice is
of quite central importance in our lives. One's choice of ends and of means
manifests the dispositions of one's will - the directions in which one is
inclined to move in life. And in making choices and commitments, one
shapes and establishes dispositions, as well as giving expression to
established dispositions. The dispositions which we form in ourselves
through our Choices may be dispositions of a kind which better enable us to
flourish as human beings in the way we are meant to flourish, or they may
be destructive of our capacities to flourish, serving to head us in false
directions in life. An example. In response to the invitation of the
organizers of this conference, I chose to give this talk. In order to give the
talk, I chose to prepare a text. My chosen end is making some contribution
to your enlightenment. My chosen means is preparing and delivering the
text. Both choices serve to give expression to, and perhaps even to deepen,
a commitment to convey certain important truths, of which I think I have
some understanding.
But among the foreseeable consequences of my choices - all too
foreseeable, I fear - are that I will induce bafflement in some, boredom in
others, and others will go away with misunderstandings I did not seek to
convey. Now, of course, I am not committed to achieving any of these
results, nor others, such as tiredness in myself. They are results I will
foreseeably produce, but they are not results which could count as
evidence of what I want to achieve. They do not show the fundamentsl
dispositions of my will, or shape those dispositions in desirable or
undesirable directions .
A voiding Consequences
That does not mean, of course, that the boredom, bafflement and
misunderstandings which arise in consequence of what I say are outside
my control. Perhaps if I performed better, some of these consequences
could be avoided. But let us suppose that I am speaking as well as I can
speak about matters like this, but boredom, bafflement and misunderstandings are nonetheless consequences, and foreseeable consequences, of
what I am saying. It would still be the case that it would be within my
control to avoid these consequences: by abandoning my choice to give the
talk.
The example illustrates the general distinction I have been seeking
May, 1990
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to explain. Some of the things I bring about in acting I intend to bring
about: they are the object of my choice. The objects of my choice are what
in a full-blooded sense I want. What I want in this full-blooded sense both
manifests and shapes those fundamental dispositions which constitute my
character, a character which either enables me to flourish as a human being
or disables me .
Other things I bring about in acting, like most of the foreseeable
consequences of what I do, I do not want in the same sense that I want my
chosen end and means. The fact that I bring such consequences about - as
boredom, bafflement and misunderstandings - does not serve to shape
my dispositions of character. There is, however, a sense in which it may be
said that I am willing they should come about: for I am aware that I could
avoid bringing them about if I were to abandon my chosen end and means.
The distinction between what I intend to bring about and what I am
willing to allow to happen (as a consequence of actions which I have good
reason to do) is of very great importance in medical ethics. Sometimes
death is a consequence of what one does, not in the sense that it is the object
of one's choice in a way which would make one into a killer, but rather in
the sense that one is willing that death should occur because one had good
reason to do, or refrain from doing, something in consequence of which
death is foreseeable.
The doctor who carries out euthanasia makes the death of the patient
the object of his choice, at least in the sense that the death of the patient is
the chosen means to end a life believed no longer worthwhile. But in
making the death of the patient the object of his choice, the doctor
profoundly shapes - and corrupts - his own dispositions. He makes his
own the belief that some human beings lack dignity so that their lives may
be disposed of without considerations of justice, and he acts on that belief:
he becomes, morally speaking, a murderer.
There is, by now, a substantial body of historical scholarship showing
the connection between the practical acceptance, by many German
doctors in the 1920s, of the beliefthat there are lives without value, devoid
of dignity, no longer worthwhile, which issued in the practice of voluntary
and non-voluntary euthanasia, and the subsequent complicity of many
members of the medical profession in the more extensively murderous
practices of the Nazis. The connection is simply that many of those doctors
had already made themselves murderers: there was little or nothing in their
beliefs, attitudes and character to stand in the way of such complicity.
It is only an insane hubris, which feeds on illusions of moral
respectability, which could induce us to believe that our own doctors could
not be corrupted as those German doctors of the 1920s and 1930s were.
Loss of Sense of Dignity
The loss of a sense of the dignity of every human being is deeply
corrupting to the practice of medicine and nursing. Human beings have
22
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a claim on skilled care just because they are human beings and not because
of status or achievement. Nor do they lose that claim because of debility or
degeneration.
Propaganda for euthanasia, when it adopts the rhetoric of political
liberalism, when it speaks of everyone being entitled to the satisfaction of
his desires in the name of autonomy, is symptomatic of the predicament of
our age and the predicament of medicine in our age. The rhetoric of
political liberalism is the voice of a culture of atomic individuals. The
atomic, isolated individual - the condition of increasing numbers in our
society - experiences degeneration and increasing dependency as
tantamount to a radical loss of dignity. People in that state of mind do not
think it possible they could be cherished and esteemed, whatever their
condition.
Human beings who believe that their dignity is essentially tied up with a
particular quality oflife need, when they ask for euthanasia, to be cared for
in ways which affirm their dignity and humanity, a dignity and humanity
recognized in the face of debility, decay and dependency. In this way, some
of them may be restored to a recognition of that truth about themselves
from which they have been too long alienated: the deepest source of their
dignity lies not in an ultimately fragile capacity for independence, but in
the humanity they share with all other men and women. This dignity we
receive in being created, so it rests not on our fragile capacity for
independence but on a radical and unbreakable dependence on the one
who created us. Our human task is to cherish each other in the
consciousness of that common dependence and our common dignity.
Because we live in a society which is characterized by profound moral
differences, medicine as an institution is no longer sustained by a shared
understanding of its proper and limited goal. In the consequent confusion,
many doctors are .tempted to see themselves merely as possessors of a
range of technical skills to be placed at the disposal of patients for the
satisfaction of whatever desires patients want satisfied.
In this perspective, euthanasia can become the final technical "fix" in the
doctor's repertoire. Confronted by the demand for euthanasia from
patients who are experiencing a profound loss of self-esteem, the doctor
who is willing to offer it is in effect saying: What you no w think is correct;
your lives are worthless, useless, without dignity. Better to end them.
But this is not the truth about human beings. Even 'in extremis', in
dependency and degeneration, they may yet glimpse the truth about their
own dignity which has been hidden from them for the whole of their lives.
Dying can be a time of truth if we accept, rather than revolt against, the
dependency that goes with dying. Medicine should not aspire to rob us of
this opportunity by offering, as its final technical "fix", killing which is
premised on a radical rejection of human dignity.6
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I. Ala wyer at the Conference was heard (by another la wyer) to dismiss the belief I here
express that there can be intentional killing by omission. There is no doubt that in English
law there can be murder by a course of omissions intended to cause death. In the text of the
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concept of murder by omission is fully confirmed by the Infanticide Act 1938, s. 1(1), and
the Homocide Act 1957, s. 2(1).
(I am indebted for the foregoing to an unpublished paper by Prof. J. M. Finnis, 'Murder
and Paediatric 'Holding Operations' ".)
The applicability of the direction in Gibbins and Proctor in Regina v Arthur (1981) was
strangely and conspicuously overlooked by the judge in that case. But it will be recalled that
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therefore say that I am satisfied that the law relating to murder and attempted murder is the
same now as it was before the trial; that it is the same irrespective of the age of the victim;
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committing any positive act." (Hansard, 9 March 1982, col. 349; emphasis added.)
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intervention which causes death". The Report's failure to recognize "intentional killing by
omission" is directly connected with what, in my view , is the clearly euthanasiast
recommendation (in paragraph 134) on what to do about babies with severe defects who
may succeed in being "lingering survivors": "Hydration should be provided and the patient
should not be deprived of the normal cuddling that expresses a fundamental human
concern"; in other words, it is acceptable to deprive the child of normal nutrition in order to
ensure that it does not succeed in being a "lingering survivor". Paragraph 134 reveals a
glaring Achilles heel in the BMA Committee's supposed opposition to euthanasia. It is
clear from paragraphs 172-175 that some ofthe decisions taken in some UK paediatric units
are euthanasiast: but this fact about present practice is not acknowledged by the Working
Party. For a fuller discussion of these matters see The Linacre Centre Working Party
Report, Euthanasia and Clinical Practice: trends. principles and alternatives (London, The
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2. The chairman of the Voluntary Euthanasia Society has sought to argue that to
describe voluntary euthanasia as killing betrays a blindness to conceptual distinctions: the
distinction is as obvious, she says, as the distinction between rape and "making love". (See
Jean Davies, "Raping and making love are different concepts: so are killing and voluntary
euthanasia", in Journal of Medical Ethics 14 (1988) , 148-149.) "Making love" is itself a
morally ambiguous euphemism, often employed in our society to describe sexual
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intercourse whether in a marital relationship, in an adulterous relationship, or as
fornication . Rape is defined as "unlawful sexual intercourse with a woman without her
consent". It is distinguished from marital intercourse, adulterous intercourse and
fornication by the absence of consent. But what it has in common with them is its being an
act of sexual intercourse. Similarly, judicial execution of a man for a capital offense and
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6. After my criticism ofthe BMA Report in Note I above, I should like to acknowledge
that the Report contains paragraphs which finely express the profound inappropriateness
of euthanasia as a solution to the human predicament of adult patients who are dying in
pain and distress. Particularly notable among these paragraphs is 146:
It is precisely because human life has depths, and a value that may take fresh and

unexpected form , even up until the moment of death, that it must not be cut short.
This commitment to the preservation of life must be tempered with a sensitivity to
the wishes and experiences of the dying patient. That sensitivity, indeed
reverence, may be blunted, as medical sensitivities so often are, when there rs an
accepted "treatment to be offered rather than an ethically demanding situation to
be confronted. Opting for a "treatment" - voluntary euthanasia - which can be
administered given certain indications precipitates the danger of substituting a
technique (which draws on professional skill) for a human response in the midst
of a deeply human experience which, above all, requires us to draw on our full
character as human beings. This implies that a reference for persons, and for the
way that we ought to relate to persons in need and for the kinds of persons we
want our doctors to be, tells against rather than/or euthanasia."
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